Volume 4: The Crown, The Treaty and the Hauraki Tribes 1800-1885

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Preface: page 17  (29 pages)
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THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1800–1885

of conduct in its purchases began to decline. The lesson of earlier Crown attempts at purchase demonstrated that the requirement for tribal consent precluded all but limited and painstakingly negotiated transactions. In light of this knowledge, land purchase officers moved towards a practice of actively undermining tribal authority in order to facilitate large-scale alienations. The correspondence of Drummond Hay in the early 1860s clearly foreshadows the policies pursued so fatally by the Crown at Waitara: the readiness to accept individual offers, and the denial of any tribal authority over the individual interest.

Other problems are identified within these transactions; in particular, the preponderance of dealing with a few Ngati Paoa chiefs to achieve purchases which were then tidied up by payments to other interest holders, attempts to obscure the potential mineral value of lands from owners by officers chosen for the trust Maori placed in them, and lack of adequate reserve provision for the future needs of vendor groups even though communities such as Patukirikiri at Coromandel, and Ngati Hei at Mercury Bay were clearly showing stress. It is argued that the perception that reserves were largely unnecessary in Hauraki since there was plenty of 'native land' in the district, had little reality in the context of a continuing purchase policy.

The reopening of the Coromandel gold field, 1861–1862

[pp. 98–101] In 1861–1862 interest revived in the Coromandel gold field, partly stimulated by the provincial Government which saw the development of the field as a solution to its economic woes. The General Government responded to that pressure, sending McLean to negotiate the opening of lands in the north of the peninsula. Crown policy continued in its pragmatic vein. Again, there appears to have been discussion neither of the prerogative, nor of the specific nature of Maori right. Acquisition of the freehold would have been preferred but in light of Hauraki's clear determination to hold onto their territory, a leasing arrangement was acceptable. The weight of Crown policy tended, however, to operate to the detriment of Hauraki's capacity to fully exercise rangatiratanga. The need for Maori consent to mining was recognised, but they were seen as having little choice other than to agree to the exploitation of the sub-surface resources of their lands and acceptance of Crown management. Again, protection of person and property from an influx of diggers was seen as dependent on Maori agreement to allow entry upon their territory for gold to be taken out. At the same time, the underlying assumption was that Maori should somehow contribute financially to the administration of the field and the maintenance of order, although how this was to be done was not explicitly stated.

A more direct recognition of Maori rights over sub-surface resources in the form of the receipt of a proportion of the gold duty was briefly contemplated by Fox but never acted upon. Instead, McLean negotiated a temporary arrangement whereby Pakeha could prospect the area, and the question of payment would be left until gold was found in `considerable quantities'. According to McLean, it was agreed that diggers might take out any gold they found in the interim; but the right of Maori to receive payment for it,

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