The agent for the Crown who effected the opening was James Mackay jnr who pursued a policy of making payments to chiefs, identified as friendly to the Government, on particular blocks within the field. Mackay sought the consent of individuals, occupying hapu, and rangatira, rather than wider tribal agreement. Those opposed to the extension of Government succumbed to the pressure as surrounding territory was opened—a process which Mackay described as 'putting in wedges' and 'letting them draw'. The kingite sections of the Hauraki tribe who had withdrawn into the interior were able to keep the lands south of Omahu Stream closed to mining for the meantime, but their rights within the proclaimed field were put to one side, and not dealt with until well after the fact. Some of the particular tactics employed by Mackay in the pursuit of cession of the gold field were also questionable. He induced agreement by making advances on the fees which would accrue to Maori once their lands were opened, and used the opportunity of the criminal prosecution of the children of one of his major opponents to obtain his consent to mining at gold-rich Waiotahi. Mackay agreed to give money to the chief concerned so that he could pay the fine and obtain the release of his sons, only on the understanding that this sum was to be taken as an advance on mining fees on that block.
By negotiation, promises of prosperity and partnership—that 'if we unite in this way we shall have treasures and riches, become a great people, and everything that the heart can desire'—the application of pressure, and a little sharp practise, Marutuahu right-holders in the peninsula were again induced to entrust their lands to the management of the Crown. The terms of the cession agreements by which the Thames and northern peninsula areas were brought under the Government's jurisdiction have been set out, on pp.140-1. In essence, Mackay brought a model which had been developed with reference to the alluvial fields of the South Island and applied it to the quartz district of Hauraki. The form of payment to Maori right-holders was based on a combination of two ideas—that of an annual lease, but one assessed on the number of miners on the field. As in earlier compacts, no direct relationship was established with the actual value of the gold, and while Maori saw the agreements of this period as signifying a Crown acknowledgment of their rights of ownership of mineral resources, subsequent Governments gave a narrower legal interpretation to the meaning of the deeds of cession, maintaining that only a right of easement had been involved. At the time, however, Hauraki signatories were satisfied by an arrangement, the terms of which seemed to acknowledge their rights over the land, and to ensure that they received returns from the development of the gold field while retaining the freehold.
Terms and implications of Thames gold field cession
[pp. 143-155] As equally significant as the written terms of the cession deeds were the verbal understandings on which Maori consent had been based, and the limitations implicit to that compact. Once again, the Hauraki people were told that realisation of the full value of their lands and long-lasting prosperity, would require 'co-operation, mutual aid, and assistance'. This report argues that the Crown quickly lost this vision of New Zealand society once Maori consent to mining was won, and their lands were locked into
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