THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880-1980

revenues—some £32 out of the £217 which had accumulated, two-fifths of which went to the Crown because it had acquired the freehold of those interests. The remaining owners refused to deal until they also had been paid their share of the gold field monies. Lewis reported that he thought that they had a 'very exaggerated opinion of the value of their interests through reports current of the gold produced by the Kapanga mine and the large amounts to be spent by the Company.' He suggested, however, that Riria's signature had given the Government 'command of the situation' and that if the others refused to come to terms, their interests could be safely excised. Furthermore, the legal status quo was settling into a greater assumption of the existence of a royal prerogative over gold and other important minerals, challenging the past recognition of Maori right which had been inherent in the early mining agreements.81 Lewis implied that the problem of Maori agreement might be overcome, since 'Chief Judge MacDonald was suggesting that the question of the right of the natives to minerals at all has never been settled and he believes the right vests in the Crown here as in England.'82 The issue was not put to the test, however, because the remaining owners agreed to sell, receiving £750 each, and outstanding revenues, with an additional £150 going to one grantee. Lewis reported himself as reasonably satisfied with this price. Although it was greater than he had hoped to pay, the total price for these last shares at £2,150, was considerably less than the £3,000 offered by the previous administration, or the £2,850 authorised by Mitchelson.83 The news of the extinguishment of Maori title was greeted with enthusiasm within the Government, as being of 'material assistance' and a 'great boon' to the district since it had been anticipated that failure would result in the 'stoppage of all English capital to [the] Northern Goldfields:84

Summary

Gold and land fever subsided in the Hauraki district after the 1870s, by which stage the Thames and Coromandel fields had greatly declined, and the Crown had acquired absolute control of the majority of those lands at Ohinemuri and Waihi that were coming into mineral production. The slowing of purchase operations in the Hauraki district reflected this declining imperative, and general policy considerations—retrenchment, the initiatives of Ballance, and fear that Maori on the peninsula would soon be without any means of support. The administrations of the 1880s were more cautious in their response to offers and suggestions of sale than their predecessors had been. They were more suspicious of claims of mineral wealth and were reluctant to become involved in the same sort of long drawn-out negotiation that had characterised the purchases of the 187os.

These constraints on purchase were, however, always liable to be put aside in response to local pressure which generally concentrated on lands which appeared to have commercial

81 See discussion in R. Anderson, Goldmining: Policy, Legislation, and Administration,' Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series ( working paper: first release), 1996, pp. 61-67.

82 Lewis to Native Minister, 13 February 1888. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 1, p. 102.

83 Lewis to Native Minister, 14 February & 1 March 1888. Ibid., pp. 102-103.

84 See Cadman to Native Minister, 14 February 1888; Native Minister file note, I March 1888. In ibid., p 103.

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