Volume 6: The Crown, The Treaty and the Hauraki Tribes, 1880-1980

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Introduction and Chapter Summary: page 27  (20 pages)
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Introduction: Chapter Summary

The Court accepted the Crown's evidence that, while there had been serious lapses in bookkeeping, no actual fraud had taken place, and reluctantly rejected the petitioners' argument that a trust had been created by the cession deeds. In the Court's view, the Crown had become a fiduciary agent responsible to Maori for 'its actions in regard to mining rights and the revenues collected, but not further or otherwise.' The petitioners could not show that the Crown had intended for them to receive those revenues after the freehold of the land had been sold, nor that a trust had been created in the land itself. MacCormick did indicate some unease, however, about both the state of the gold field revenue accounts, and the nature of the gold field purchases. The Crown was unable to render a completely satisfactory account of the revenues received and expended by it. Thus, if the petitioners had been unable to prove that any wrong-doing had taken place in the administration of the revenues, the Crown had been unable to show, definitively, that they had no grievance. MacCormick was also critical of earlier Crown agents for leading Maori into 'very bad bargains' when they sold the land. He thought the offence was mitigated by the general practice of the period, and the fact that the real profits from mining came after later technological developments. Nonetheless, in his opinion, these transactions would not have been approved had they been subject to judicial review.

Although actual illegal deed had not been proved, MacCormick recommended that the Crown make an ex-gratia payment of between £30,000 and £40,000, in view of 'the large sums received by the Crown by reason of its purchases of the freehold of land previously ceded to it for mining purposes', questions whether Maori had 'fully appreciated the effect of their sales, and the further doubt as to the proper distribution to the Natives of the moneys they were entitled to'.

For the next 50 years, the Hauraki people petitioned repeatedly for the Crown to implement that recommendation, being thwarted by the turnabout of ministries, narrow official construction of responsibility, and Government reluctance to admit liability for nineteenth century transactions. As the question was brought to the attention of; and reexamined by successive administrations, two divergent attitudes emerged. The dominant view within Government was that the claim was stale and unfounded: that the Crown had made payment in good faith when the rights to minerals and to lands had been first acquired and that the 'Court which considered the claim had not found any grounds ... which would provide a reasonable basis for a special payment at this distance of time.' Treasury officials were particularly hostile to the idea of making such a compensatory payment, arguing that to thus address questions of fairness of transaction and understanding of bargain would set a dangerous precedent, likely to reopen the majority of sales in New Zealand. This view was echoed by others such as Ivor Prichard who was directed to look into the question by the Holyoake administration.

A significant dissenting view was voiced, however, generally within the Labour administrations which, over the years, made promises to Hauraki leaders which went unfulfilled before defeat at the elections. Of particular note was Peter Fraser's expressions of endorsement, in 1947–1949, for a proposal from the Hauraki iwi that the sum

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