cruel savages' who 'must be thrashed' then have 'their millions of useless acres' confiscated, and 'occupied by military settlers in all directions'.79 The organ of the philo-Maori colonists was the New-Zealander whose editor was John Williamson; it attacked the Southern Cross for its 'd....d nigger tone' when speaking of our 'dark-skinned brethren',80 denouncing the staff of the Southern Cross as the 'literary hirelings of the war-at-any-price party'.81 Williamson's partner, W.C. Wilson, found the editor's policy of opposing recourse to war and confiscations quite unacceptable. He broke up his partnership with Williamson and started a new pro-war paper-the New Zealand Herald.82 Williamson became one of a dwindling band. He was defeated in a crucial contest for the superintendency of the province in November 1862 by an acknowledged hardliner, Robert Graham (later to be founder of Grahamstown). This made for a united governmental front on both levels (colonial and provincial) in the capital during the crucial period of confrontation and war with Kingite Maori, because the general government between August 1862 and November 1864, led first by Domett and then by Whitaker, likewise stood for the subjugation of all 'rebels'.

A more uniform 'Native Policy' emerges, 1864 on

However, anticipating somewhat, the Waikato war and Maori protest movements such as Pai Marire which continued after it, tended to create a more unified attitude among the Auckland settlers on the 'Native question'. On the one hand, the conciliatory policies of the philo-Maoris tended to be watered down as time went by, for they were offended by Maori separatism and by well-publicised violent episodes such as the Volkner killing. On the other hand, the firebrands were chastened by the military prowess displayed by Maori during the Taranaki, Waikato and Bay of Plenty campaigns; by 1864 it had become clear that a swift and total defeat of Maori was far beyond the capacity of the colonial forces. In the later 1860s the undoubted success of Titokowaru and Te Kooti also kept settler bellicosity in check and reinforced the belief that a circumspect even conciliatory policy toward Maori was likely to be the better strategy.

In fact, right through the decade, differences between settler leaders over how best to solve the 'Native problem' were less clearcut than they superficially seemed. Amongst virtually all settlers and their political leaders, there was general acceptance as self-evident truth that the agreed objective in racial policy must be to raise Maori to `civilisation' by integration within the western economic and social order. Few questioned this objective. Settlers simply divided over lesser issues: the means and timing by which this could be brought about.

Reinforcing this policy in Auckland were that settlement's economic imperatives-the need to have access to resources in order to maintain living standards and prevent population outflow to other parts of the colony, and develop a viable export base in a regional economy lacking the pastoral advantages of the southern settlements.

79 W. Brown to J.L. Campbell, 16, 19 Oct. 1863, Fol. 160, Campbell P., Auckland Museum; also R.C.J. Stone, Father and his Gift, Auckland, 1987, p. 38.

80 New-Zealander, 6 Jan. 1863, p. 2, col. 5.

81 Ibid., 30 April 1863, p. 7, col. 3.

82 Cyclopedia of NZ, Vol. 2, p. 269

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