Introduction: Overview and Argument

best strategy for the future was to resist further encroachment, others made it their business to seize whatever advantages were on offer. In the post-war years, Hauraki leaders displayed a variety of responses; more appear to have maintained their opposition than to have welcomed the changes. Probably opposition to government grew as colonisation advanced. Puckey, in his last report as Native Agent, listed the 'friendly' leaders who had died since he took up his position in 1869, and went on: 'I regret to say the younger men who have succeeded them do not seem to have the same influence for good' (AJHR 1880 G4). The leaders who co-operated with the government had a stark choice—either to resist constant and heavy pressure or to join the winning side in the hope of securing at least some advantages. Though, as might be expected, some acted from motives of personal gain, this is at best a small part of the explanation.

1.29 Because, perhaps, Hauraki leaders who co-operated with government were praised by officials and settlers at the time, their activities have become altogether too familiar. Other leaders resisted the loss of tribal lands for many years, even if in the end unsuccessfully. Further, specific items of government policy prompted a regular succession of protests, often from 'co-operative' leaders such as W.H. Taipari on the matter of gold revenues (Thames Advertiser, 10 and 11 February 1893) over the later 19th century, again without effect.

1.30 In this context of rapid change, pressure and division, land agents both government and private were presented with golden opportunities. They vigorously solicited and engineered offers of the sale of interests in land. They exploited internal divisions, between iwi and within iwi, separating out those who were willing to sell and using such consent to turn up the pressure upon the others. In the critical 187os the infamous system of raihana (rations) prevailed, as Mackay made a multitude of hand-outs to Maori and exploited this induced indebtedness to enforce assent to sales (Anderson). Government agents bought up storekeeper debts and thus were able to manipulate Maori indebtedness to enforce agreements to sell. They financed surveys for Maori owners (required before the Land Court would grant title) and used the outstanding costs of survey to compel sales once the Court had determined title. However 'willing' they might appear, Maori sellers cannot be represented as free agents; it would be more generally true to say that they were acting under a duress exercised by the agents of government with the sanction of the state.

1.31 In addition, Maori were influenced by assurances that they would benefit from a prosperous colonial future. Politicians and officials held out this prospect as the reward Maori could expect for their co-operation. The Superintendent of Auckland, John Williamson, became almost lyrical in depicting the advantages Maori could expect from co-operating in the opening of the Kauaeranga goldfield in 1866: 'If we unite together ... we shall have treasures and riches. ... Your children will be benefited ...' (Anderson). But the advantages were not equitably shared; those which did accrue to Maori proved to be short-lived. In the 1870s and the 1880s returns to Maori from gold

11